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JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS (RET.)* 
Thank you for that very kind introduction and nice welcome. It’s 
always a pleasure to address an audience in this forum. I’ve been 
here before and I’ve always enjoyed it, and I hope I’ll enjoy it today. 
As I understand it we are celebrating the University of Miami 
law school’s program. The topic for discussion at this symposium is 
“The Constitution on Campus: Do Students Shed their Rights at the 
Schoolhouse Gates?” Because the question closely parrots the ex-
cerpt from the Supreme Court’s opinion in the student speech case 
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,1 I 
infer that among the principle rights at issue are those protected by 
the First Amendment. Mr. Justice Fortas’ opinion and the Court pro-
vided a categorical answer to the question. He wrote: “First Amend-
ment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the 
school environment, are available to teachers and students. It can 
hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitu-
tional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse 
gate.”2 But then rather surprisingly, instead of citing cases interpret-
ing the First Amendment, he continued: 
This has been the unmistakable holding of this Court 
for 50 years. In Meyer v. Nebraska and Bartels v. 
Iowa, this Court, in opinions by Mr. Justice McReyn-
olds, held that the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment prevented States from forbidding 
the teaching of a foreign language to young students. 
                                                                                                             
 *  Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 1975–2010.  
 1 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 2 Id. at 506. 
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Statutes to this effect, the Court held, unconstitution-
ally interfere with the liberty of teacher, student, and 
parent.3 
Thus, the Tinker case, which at first seemed to point only at First 
Amendment rights, actually suggests our topic should be more en-
compassing. 
The answer to the question whether students have shed their con-
stitutional rights necessarily depends on what rights the student 
seeks to exercise in the setting in which he does so. Clearly no        
student has the right during a mathematics class to argue at length 
and without interruption of the importance of minimizing global 
warming. But it is equally clear that she cannot be punished for ex-
pressing her views about that issue in response to a question in a 
science class. And even assuming that five members of the Supreme 
Court correctly held that the Second Amendment protects the          
citizen’s right to possess a handgun in his home,4 it does not follow 
that the right has been shed if a court concludes it does not extend 
to carrying the weapon in such places as a college campus. In short, 
it is necessary to determine the scope of a given right before decid-
ing whether the right has been shed or impermissibly burdened in a 
school setting. 
Presumably students have the same fundamental rights as those 
enjoyed by other members of the public. On at least two occasions, 
however, a majority of the Court has drawn those principles into 
question, at least as it pertains to high school students. In both cases, 
I dissented from the majority’s discussion and decision limiting the 
constitutional rights of public school students. In 1986, I dissented 
from Chief Justice Berger’s opinion for the Court in Bethel School 
District No. 403 v. Fraser.5 In that case, a Washington high school 
student named Matthew Fraser had given a speech at a school as-
sembly nominating a classmate for student elective office.6 Fraser’s 
speech contained sexual innuendo and suggestive conduct.7 The 
                                                                                                             
 3 Id. 
 4 See generally Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 5 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
 6 See id. at 677. 
 7 See id. at 677–678. 
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school suspended him for violating a rule prohibiting the use of ob-
scene language on campus.8 A majority of the Supreme Court up-
held the disciplinary action.9 Although I agreed that Fraser did not 
necessarily have a constitutional right to deliver his speech at a 
school assembly, I thought it clear that he had not received adequate 
notice that he might be punished for doing so.10 The school agreed 
that Fraser had violated the rule against “disruptive conduct,” but in 
my view that prohibition was insufficient to notify Fraser that his 
speech would illicit disciplinary consequences, particularly as there 
was no evidence Fraser’s speech had caused any material disruption 
to the school’s educational activities.11 In light of the interest in free 
expression protected by the First Amendment and the interest in fair 
procedure protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, I would have 
held the constitution barred the school’s punitive response to Fra-
ser’s speech. 
In 2007, I dissented from Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion for the 
Court in Morse v. Frederick.12 In that case, Alaska high school stu-
dent Joseph Frederick was disciplined for displaying a fourteen-foot 
banner bearing the puzzling phrase, “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.”13 You 
have to pause for a minute and reflect on the meaning of that mes-
sage. That case was quite remarkable because the majority first con-
cluded that Frederick’s ambiguous message could reasonably be 
construed as advocating the use of illegal drugs and then held that 
his message could be censored for that very reason.14 Contrary to a 
mountain of precedent, the majority determined that the First 
Amendment did not merely permit censorship based on the content 
of the student’s message, but more perversely, that it permitted cen-
sorship based on disagreement with the speaker’s viewpoint. The 
majority’s opinion in Morse limited protection for student speech in 
a manner that was wholly unsupported by the Court’s First Amend-
ment jurisprudence. Conversely, Morse adopted a blanket rule that 
student speech may be censored anytime a public school official    
                                                                                                             
 8 See id. at 678. 
 9 See id. at 685. 
 10 See id. at 696 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 11 Id. 
 12 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
 13 Id. at 393. 
 14 See id. at 394–395. 
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reasonably perceives that speech as advocating illegal drug use. As 
an initial matter, I doubt that Frederick’s original phrase, “BONG 
HiTS 4 JESUS,” could be reasonably understood as advocating an-
ything. In any event, the principal of Frederick’s high school inter-
preted the words on his banner as encouraging marijuana use, 15 a 
message with which he disagreed. Under First Amendment doctrine, 
viewpoint based regulation of speech is presumptively unconstitu-
tional, and advocacy of illegal conduct may be punished only when 
the advocacy is likely to invite lawless action.16 Yet, the majority 
ignored those basic First Amendment principles and upheld Freder-
ick’s punishment based on school officials’ opposition to his        
message, or one possible interpretation of his message.  
Before Morse, “the beliefs of third parties reasonable or other-
wise”17 never dictated which messages amount to proscribable ad-
vocacy. That’s a quote from my dissent. I see no reason why the 
subjective views of state officials should control the extent of First 
Amendment protection on campus when listeners’ perceptions do 
not determine the scope of First Amendment rights in other contexts. 
Even if Frederick had intended to promote marijuana use, there was 
no indication that his speech would have any persuasive influence 
on his classmates. As I noted in my dissent, 
Most students. . . do not shed their brains at the 
schoolhouse gate, and most students know dumb ad-
vocacy when they see it. The notion that the message 
on this banner would persuade even the average stu-
dent or even the dumbest one to change his or her 
behavior is most implausible.18 
The majority opinion in Morse is particularly troublesome given 
that the Tinker decision had already established that basic First 
Amendment protections apply in public schools. In Tinker, several 
public school students in Des Moines, Iowa planned to wear black 
armbands to express their opposition to the Vietnam War.19 The Des 
                                                                                                             
 15 See id. at 398. 
 16 See id. at 436 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 17 Id. at 441 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 18 Id. at 444 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 19 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 
(1969). 
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Moines public school district adopted a policy calling for the sus-
pension of any student who refused to remove the armband.20 The 
students challenged the policy on First Amendment grounds and the 
Court determined the policy violated the constitution.21 The school 
district had argued that its censorship was justified because it feared 
the students’ expression of a controversial and unpopular opinion 
would generate disturbances.22 But the Court held that the school 
district’s purported fear of disturbance, without more, cannot justify 
the suppression of student speech.23  
Rather, the Court explained in order for public school officials 
to justify prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, they must 
be able to show that their action “was caused by something more 
than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that 
always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”24 Where there is no 
showing that the forbidden conduct would materially infringe on 
rights of others or disrupt schools’ educational programs, the cen-
sorship cannot be sustained. Tinker thus stands for the proposition 
that nondestructive student speech cannot be banned merely because 
it expressed a viewpoint that is unpopular or contradictory to the 
school’s message. I would have applied this rule in the Morse case 
to hold that Frederick could not be punished for displaying his ban-
ner. 
The Tinker rule is not only consistent with the First Amendment 
doctrine, but also has the important benefit of protecting students’ 
intellectual openness and exchange. When the Tinker students wore 
their black armbands in 1965, mainstream public opinion regarded 
opposition to the Vietnam War as “unpatriotic, if not treason.”25 As 
I noted in my Morse dissent, Des Moines school district was not 
unreasonable for fearing that the arm bands might start an argument 
or cause a disturbance.26 Nevertheless, the Tinker Court insisted that 
                                                                                                             
 20 See id. 
 21 See id. at 514. 
 22 See id. at 508. 
 23 See id. at 514. 
 24 Id. at 509. 
 25 Id. at 526 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 26 See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 447 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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under the constitution, we must take that risk.27 It is this sort of haz-
ardous freedom, this kind of openness that is the basis of our national 
strength, and the independence and vigor of Americans who grow 
up and live in this relatively permissive, often disputatious society. 
It seems to me that protecting this openness is no less important 
on campus than elsewhere in society. For even in high school, a rule 
that permits only one point of view to be expressed is less likely to 
produce correct answers than the open discussion of countervailing 
views. Ironically on the same day that the chief justice announced 
the decision upholding viewpoint based discrimination in Morse, he 
also announced the judgment of the Court in Federal Election Com-
mission v. Wisconsin Right to Life.28 That case was a 5-4 decision 
that later paved the way for the Court’s most unfortunate decision in 
Citizens United.29 In Wisconsin Right to Life, the Court declared that 
when it comes to defining what speech qualifies as unprotected ad-
vocacy, “we give the benefit of the doubt to speech, not censor-
ship.”30 Students of the First Amendment might wonder why that 
rule applies to corporate entities that wish to contribute unlimited 
funds to influence elections for a public office, but not to students 
who wish to express an unpopular point of view inside the school-
house gate.  
Thank you very much. 
                                                                                                             
 27 See id. 
 28 Federal Election Com’n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 
(2007). 
 29 See generally Citizens United v. Federal Election Com’n, 558 U.S. 310 
(2010). 
 30 Wisconsin Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 482. 
